The significant expansion of presidential power in this area was first manifested in President McKinley`s government. At the beginning of the war with Spain, the President announced that the United States would be bound by the last three principles of the Paris Declaration for the duration, a course that, as Professor Wright points out, “would undoubtedly go a long way to defining these three principles as an international law, mandatory for the United States in future wars.” 473 Hostilities with Spain ended in August 1898 with a ceasefire, the terms of which largely determine the subsequent peace treaty,474, as well as the ceasefire of 11 November 1918, largely determine the conditions for final peace with Germany in 1918. It was also President McKinley who, in 1900, relied solely on his sole authority as commander-in-chief, brought a 5,000-strong ground force and a naval force to work with similar contingents of other powers to save the beijing legations from boxers; A year later, without consulting Congress or the Senate, he accepted for the United States the protocol for compensation for boxers between China and the intermediate powers.475 Commenting on the Beijing Protocol, Willoughby quotes with his consent the following remark: “This case is interesting because it shows how the force of circumstances has forced us to adopt European practice in reference to an international agreement. which, with the exception of the issue of compensation, was almost exclusively political in nature . . . . Purely political treaties are usually concluded in Europe only by the executive, within the framework of constitutional practice. However, the situation in China largely justified President McKinley`s failure to submit the minutes to the Senate. Beijing`s isolation, jealousy between allies and the evolution of the Chinese government`s escape tactics would have made an agreement on the ground anything but impossible. 476 During this period, John Hay, as McKinley`s Foreign Minister, initiated his “open door” policy with notes to Britain, Germany and Russia, which were quickly followed by notes similar to those of France, Italy and Japan. They essentially asked the beneficiaries to formally declare that they would not seek to expand their respective interests in China at the expense of one of the others; and all responded positively.477 Then, in 1905, the first Roosevelt to reach a diplomatic agreement with Japan initiated an exchange of views between the then Minister of War Taft in the Far East and Count Katsura, who amounted to a secret treaty by which the Roosevelt administration committed to establishing a military protectorate in Korea by Japan.478 Three years later Three years later , Foreign Minister Root and the Japanese Ambassador to Washington concluded the root-Takahira 479 agreement Meanwhile, in 1907, through a “gentleman`s agreement”, Mikado`s government had agreed to stem the emigration of Japanese subsectors to the United States and thus relieve the Washington government of the need to take measures that would have cost Japan the loss. The end result of this series of executive agreements affecting U.S.
relations in the Far East and the Far East was the result of President Wilson`s diplomacy. It was the Lansing Ishii agreement, enshrined in an exchange of letters of November 2, 1917, in which the United States recognized Japan`s “special interests” in China and Japan approved the open door principle in that country.480 What kind of commitment does the president impose on the United States? It is clear that it can impose international obligations with potentially serious consequences, and it is equally clear that these obligations can be extended over a long period of time.488 The nature of national obligations imposed by executive agreements is not so obvious.